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In April 2008, the New Zealand Government issued a government tax policy discussion document 
considering whether families should be able to access a form of income splitting through the New 
Zealand tax system. In Australia and New Zealand, as with most other OECD countries, the individual 
is the unit of taxation. In applying the principles of equity, families are entitled to certain benefits, 
currently delivered primarily through the welfare system. This results in a mismatch between the unit 
taken into account for tax and welfare. In this article, the author explores the concept of the tax unit. 
The article will review, first, the two main methods of joint taxation, being the accumulation method 
and the income splitting method, examining the equity and efficiency of each method. The article will 
then review the New Zealand proposal in the context of this analysis. Finally, some of the alternative 
methods of providing support for the family will be discussed. 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Determining the appropriate tax unit within a particular jurisdiction, for a particular tax, is a 
necessary component of that tax system. The tax unit establishes the boundaries of the tax. It 
determines who is liable, and limits the tax to the resources of that person. 
From time to time, there is vigorous debate as to whether the appropriate tax unit for the income tax 
is the individual, as adopted in most OECD1 countries (including New Zealand and Australia), couples, 
as in the United States (US),2 or entire families along the lines of the French model.3 Such debates are 
widely followed by politicians, the media and the general public, who intuitively believe that families 
are not well catered for within the taxation system. The Liberal Party of Australia, while in opposition 
in the early 1990s, included income splitting in its platform on the basis that it is fairer to families, 
although when in government this policy was replaced firstly by the increased tax thresholds for 
families, then by the Family Tax Benefit. 
                                                
1 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
2 M Brooks, “The Tax Unit and Rate Structure: A Criticism of the Orthodoxy”, (1997) Vol 52:1 Public Finance 22; M 
McIntyre, “Marital Income Splitting in the Modern World: Lessons for Australia from the American Experience”, in J Head 
and R Krever (eds), Tax Units and the Tax Rate Scale, (Sydney, Australian Tax Research Foundation, 1996), p 1. 
3 A-T Dang and J-M Monnier, “The French System of Direct and Indirect Family Transfers and the Principles of Justice”, 
(2004) Vol 38:3 Journal of Economic Issues 683. 
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In New Zealand, the current debate was reignited by the election of members of the United Future 
Party in the 2005 General Election. As part of the Confidence and Supply Agreement entered into 
between the Labour Party and United Future Party in the formation of government, the Labour Party 
agreed to produce a discussion document on income splitting. This discussion document4 was 
published on 27 April 2008. 
In this article, the author will explore the concept of the tax unit. The first part of the article – 
sections 2, 3 and 4 – will review the two main methods of joint taxation, being the accumulation 
method and the income splitting method, examining the equity and efficiency of each method. The 
New Zealand proposal will then be reviewed (in sections 5 and 6) in the context of this analysis. 
Finally, in section 7 some of the alternative methods of providing support for the family will be 
discussed. 
2.0 JOINT TAXATION SYSTEMS 
While Australia and New Zealand5 have always adopted the individual as the tax unit, there are a 
number of different models that have been adopted in other jurisdictions. Joint taxation on the income 
of couples can take one of two models: the aggregation model is a tax on joint income, with both 
parties jointly liable for the tax, while the income splitting model allows income to be allocated 
between the parties. Variations to these forms include taxing property income on a joint basis with 
earnings being taxed on an individual basis; joint taxation may be optional; other family members may 
be incorporated in the model as in France, and the tax scales may reflect the different status of joint 
taxation. 
Although many countries, such as the United Kingdom (UK), traditionally adopted the married 
couple as the tax unit, the trend across OECD countries, over the past 30 years, has been to move away 
from joint taxation systems to individual taxation systems. The UK made the move to individual 
taxation in the 1970s, although the “married man’s allowance” was retained until 2000. This trend is 
justified on both equity and efficiency grounds. 
3.0 EQUITY ISSUES 
While equity is commonly categorised as horizontal and vertical equity, vertical equity can be further 
described as redistributive equity. While horizontal equity is concerned with ensuring that those who 
are in the same position should carry the same taxation burden, vertical equity ensures that the tax 
system recognises that income alone is not always a measure of a person’s circumstances and ability to 
pay taxes.6 In the context of the tax unit debate, the principle of horizontal equity requires that if two 
                                                
4 Inland Revenue, Income Splitting for Families with Children: A Government Tax Policy Discussion Document, (Wellington, 
April 2008), hereafter referred to as “the Income Splitting Discussion Document”. 
5 Although a form of income aggregation was applied in New Zealand to high income married couples between 1939 and 
1962. 
6 See OECD, OECD Tax Policy Studies No 13: Fundamental Reform of Personal Income Tax, (Paris, 2006), p 41: 
 “Horizontal equity from a tax perspective implies that taxpayers in an equal situation should be taxed in an equal manner as 
they have the same ability to bear the tax burden. Horizontal equity then implies that the tax on a given level of total income 
should be the same regardless of how this income is composed (e.g. wage and pension income, fringe benefits or any form of 
capital income including imputed income from owner-occupied housing and capital gains on an accruals basis). However, 
the notion of “an equal situation” can be ambiguous. Some tax systems consider, for instance, the number of children or the 
marital status as a relevant difference for tax purposes while other tax systems do not. Moreover, the notion of “an equal 
situation” can be interpreted not only on the basis of income but also on the basis of taxpayer’s welfare. The notion’s 
meaning might change over time as well. The tax policy objective of vertical equity prescribes that taxpayers with better 
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persons are earning the same level of income, they should pay the same amount of tax – although one 
earner may be single, while the other is a sole earner supporting a spouse and children. Clearly, it costs 
more to support a family than to support a single person, with studies showing that two cannot live as 
cheaply as one – although they can live more cheaply than two single persons.7 A further dimension to 
equity is the need to ensure gender equity, that is, that the system is not biased in favour of one gender 
over the other. This is commonly seen in “traditional” family structures where a male breadwinner, as 
the taxpayer, may be the recipient of any concessions provided through the tax system8. Transfer 
payments are more commonly paid directly to the carer within the family. 
Arguments that the individual is the more equitable tax unit are often based on issues of gender 
politics and property rights. In 1975, in the comprehensive review of the Australian taxation system 
chaired by the Hon Justice KW Asprey, he noted in the following reservation to the final report:9 
“In my opinion, in the world of today a married woman should be treated both under the general law 
and in the taxation system as an individual in her own right and, in relation to the income which is 
both morally and legally her own, she should pay no more and no less tax than if she were a single 
person.” 
Historically, the UK income tax was developed at a time when women did not have the right to own 
property in their own right. Accordingly, it was logical for the tax system to be based on joint 
household income. Among families liable for income tax in the nineteenth century, any income that the 
wife brought to a marriage was likely to be property income, which is more readily alienated and 
allocable between family members, rather than income from labour. In contrast, Australia has never 
had a joint income tax. By the time of Federation, the rights of women to own property and earn 
income in their own right were well established, although many married women were still financially 
supported by their husband. 
Among the social changes of the twentieth century was a trend for women to be more likely to be 
engaged in gainful employment. This trend could be observed during both World Wars, as women took 
the place of men in the workforce; and in a more sustained manner in the second half of the century as 
women not only remained in the workforce after marriage, but demanded equality in the workplace. 
Coupled with these changes is a more active involvement in the management, and sharing, of 
household finances. The extent of pooling of resources within marriage now varies between couples 
from full sharing of all earnings, to maintaining separate financial accounts.10 
In the face of such social changes and demands for equality, a joint taxation system is an anomaly 
that may suit some couples but be resented by others, as it demands a full disclosure of information 
between the couple and imposes obligations without necessarily conferring rights to property and 
                                                                                                                                         
circumstances should bear a larger part of the tax burden as a proportion of their income. Vertical equity then implies that the 
distribution of after-tax income should be narrower than the distribution of before-tax income, or that the average tax rate 
should be increasing in income. This can be achieved by having a basic allowance and/or by having a progressive rate 
schedule (marginal tax rates that are increasing with income) 
7 J Hills, R Smithies and A McKnight, “Tracking Income: How Working Families’ Incomes Vary Through the Year”, (CASE 
Report 32, ESRC Research Center for Analysis of Social Exclusion, London, 2006). 
8 B Cass and D Brennan, “Taxing Women: The Politics of Gender in the Tax/Transfer System”, (2003) Vol 1:1 eJournal of 
Tax Research 37. 
9 Taxation Review Committee (KW Asprey (Chair)), Full Report, (Canberra, 1975). The Reservation was appended to 
Chapter 10 of the Report. 
10 See n 7. 
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income of one member of the couple. While the principle of joint taxation may seem to be a means of 
applying vertical equity,11 in its original form it is in fact based on horizontal equity, and operates to the 
detriment of married couples. Joint taxation aggregates the income earned by both members of the 
couple, and taxes them as if earned by a single tax unit. A limited aggregation model was applied in 
New Zealand in relation to high income married couples between 1939 and 1962. Where the tax scale 
is a progressive scale, this has the effect of taxing the second income at the marginal tax rate of the first 
income earner. To compensate for this, a different tax scale may be adopted with wider bands, as in the 
US. 
The alternative form of “joint” taxation is income splitting, which enables the members of a 
household to divide the income between the members of that household. In most jurisdictions, this is 
limited to the members of a “couple”, the definition of which may vary between jurisdictions: it may 
include married couples only; de facto couples; and/or legal civil partnerships between same-sex 
couples. However, under the French quotient system the ability to split income among members of a 
household also extends to children within the household, although each child counts for less than the 
adults of the household. 
The “income splitting” form of joint taxation may be considered to be more equitable as it places 
single income families in the same position as dual income families. In an income splitting system that 
also applies progressive tax rates and a tax-free threshold, families effectively obtain access to two tax-
free thresholds, and broader income bands for each step in the tax rates scale. Much of the discourse 
surrounding income splitting in New Zealand and Australia arises from the fact that families in receipt 
of income from property or business sources may already be able to access a form of income splitting 
through the implementation of appropriate business structures.12 
The US is a good case study to examine the differences between the two forms of joint taxation as it 
has utilised each of these forms at different periods. The introduction of joint taxation in the US was a 
response to the different legal systems in place in different states, which is a matter of constitutional 
history. In 1930, the Supreme Court handed down two apparently contradictory rulings: in Poe v 
Seaborn13 it ruled that spouses in community property states could return half of the joint income of 
spouses, while in Lucas v Earl14 it held that income splitting was not valid in common law states. 
Accordingly, in 1948 a federal law was adopted that would ensure that the residents of all states could 
split income between spouses. 
While this was adopted ostensibly to promote horizontal equity between families residing in 
community property states and families residing in common law states, commentators also suggest that 
the move was a response to social conditions post-war, which saw women returning to home duties 
after working during the war.15 By the 1960s, it was suggested that single taxpayers were 
disadvantaged by the availability of income splitting to married taxpayers, as married couples obtained 
                                                
11 T Dwyer, “The Taxation of Shared Family Income”, in P Saunders (ed), Taxploitation: The Case for Income Tax Reform, 
(New South Wales, Centre for Independent Studies, 2006). 
12 T Cooper, “Taxing the family unit: income splitting for all?”, (1995) Vol 5:1-2 Revenue Law Journal 82; C Fisher and K 
Ritchie, “The Simply Impossible Pursuit of Simplicity in Changing the Tax Unit in New Zealand: Income Splitting”, (Paper 
presented at the 19th Annual Australasian Tax Teachers Association Conference, Brisbane, Australia, 22-24 January 2007). 
13 Poe v Seaborn (1930) 282 US 101 (SC). 
14 Lucas v Earl (1930) 281 US 111 (SC). 
15 N Brooks, “The Irrelevance of Conjugal Relationships in Assessing Tax Liability”, in J Head and R Krever (eds), Tax Units 
and the Tax Rate Scale, (Sydney, Australian Tax Research Foundation, 1996), 35. 
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the benefit of effectively doubling the band width of the progressive tax rates. It was perceived that this 
benefit put married couples in an advantageous position relative to single taxpayers as the single person 
on the same total income as a married couple would pay substantially more tax, while the synergies 
obtained by pooling resources means that on a measure of the ability to pay, the married couple on the 
same total income are financially more able to pay the tax. 
The response to this perceived inequity resulted in the adoption of a joint taxation schedule in 1969. 
The income of married couples was aggregated and the tax brackets were increased compared to those 
applied to single taxpayers. There was also a guarantee that a single person would pay no more than 
120 percent of the tax payable by a married person on the same income. However, where the two 
partners in a marriage were earning similar levels of income, the aggregation could result in them 
paying more tax than two single persons, as the new brackets were less than double the width of those 
available for single persons. This discrepancy became known as the “marriage penalty”, and was 
considered to be a deterrent to marriage. On equity grounds, it was argued that individual taxation was 
fairer as it eliminated the marriage penalty.16 
Currently, US couples have the option of filing joint returns or separate returns. However, if they 
choose to file separately they are unable to access a number of deductions and allowances, while 
paying the same rate of tax, resulting in a higher tax burden. The rate schedules are such that low and 
middle income earners pay the same rate of tax whether they are single, married filing jointly or 
married filing separately. When joint income exceeds US$128,500 married couples face increased 
rates, through contracting tax brackets, when compared to the tax payable by two single persons each 
earning half of that amount. The effect of this structure is that where the earnings of the two spouses is 
not equal, the higher income earner obtains the benefit of paying a lower rate of tax on part of their 
earnings – the marriage bonus. However, where joint earnings exceed US$128,500 the second income 
earner effectively pays tax at the highest marginal tax rate – the marriage penalty. 
The point that should be made from the US experience is that the concept of equity is a fluid concept. 
While it is generally acknowledged that some adjustment needs to be made to tax schedules to reflect 
the “traditional” family structure, the application of progressive tax scales can result in inequities when 
compared to the tax payable either by a single person earning the same income as a married couple, or 
by couples cohabiting in a relationship that is not legally recognised as being married. 
The “income splitting” form of joint taxation may be criticised as being overly generous to families 
and conferring a marriage bonus, while the “aggregation” form of joint taxation may be considered 
unfair to families as it imposes a marriage penalty with families paying more tax than two individuals, 
unless the tax bands are adjusted to reflect the joint nature of the earnings. 
4.0 EFFICIENCY CONSIDERATIONS 
The previous discussion of the equity issues raises the question of the relative efficiency of joint 
taxation systems. Clearly, where there are non-neutralities, such as marriage bonuses or penalties, it 
raises the possibility that these will be considered by taxpayers when making decisions, and there will 
be consequent inefficiencies in the system. 
In the case of joint taxation systems, there are three areas where inefficiencies can be observed: 
marriage decisions; workforce participation and effective marginal tax rates. 
                                                
16 N Brooks, “The Irrelevance of Conjugal Relationships in Assessing Tax Liability”, in J Head and R Krever (eds), Tax Units 
and the Tax Rate Scale, (Sydney, Australian Tax Research Foundation, 1996), 35. 
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4.1 Marriage Decisions 
If there is a marriage penalty, which is most likely to arise under an aggregation form of joint 
taxation, there may be a disincentive to marry, or to stay married. The marriage penalty may arise in a 
pure aggregation system where the tax brackets are not double those applied to individual taxpayers, so 
that income earned by the spouse is taxed at the marginal tax rate of the primary income earner. It is 
more likely to arise where the income of each spouse is approximately equal, as there is not sufficient 
disparity in relative incomes to transfer the benefit of lower marginal tax rates to the higher income 
earners. 
It would be naïve to suggest that taxation issues are the major motivator for marriage. However, at a 
time when social attitudes to marriage are changing, and co-habitation is becoming more acceptable, 
taxation considerations may become a part of the overall consideration. This is also affected by the 
policy of the particular jurisdiction on the recognition of de facto relationships or civil unions, and the 
problems in enforcing such recognition.17 It is more likely that the timing of such decisions will be 
affected than that the decision itself will be changed.18 A couple who were motivated by the taxation 
treatment of the marital unit could adjust their relationship to suit: in the early stages of the relationship 
they could co-habit while both partners are working full-time, paying single tax rates and avoiding the 
marriage penalty. If the wife chose to interrupt her career to have children, they could marry at the 
appropriate time and take advantage of the marriage bonus, then, conceivably, when the wife was able 
to return to work, and earn an income sufficient to incur the marriage penalty, the couple could divorce 
and continue to co-habit, although the evidence suggests that this third stage is less likely. In New 
Zealand, such anomalies are largely eliminated through access to civil unions, and de facto 
partnerships, which bestow the same rights and obligations as marriage. 
This pattern is also likely to reflect the extent of the co-mingling of resources within the family: it is 
during the period that the wife does not earn an independent income that the husband is likely to be 
providing financial support for her and the children of the marriage. It is likely that as the wife’s 
income increases on her return to the workforce, her own needs are more likely to be met by her own 
earnings – although the needs of the children reflect more complex resource sharing issues.19 
The French system is unusual among OECD countries in that income splitting is based on all 
members of the household rather than just the earning adults. Such a system moves away from the need 
to define the family based on the relationship between the adults, but it does raise questions as to how 
the family should be defined. 
It has been argued that when defining family relationships for the purposes of tax and welfare law, 
the spousal relationship should be disregarded in favour of relationships between a parent and child.20 
However, if the family was defined on this basis the special circumstances of blended families would 
need to be considered. Would the children be acknowledged in the family of the birth and step-parents, 
would it be based on custodial arrangements, or would the relationship be on the basis of some form of 
                                                
17 H Hodgson, “More than Just DNA: Tax, Welfare and the Family”, (Paper presented at the 19th Annual Australasian Tax 
Teachers Association Conference, Brisbane, Australia, 23 January 2007). 
18 J Alm, S Dickert-Conlin and LA Whittington, “Policy Watch: The Marriage Penalty'”, (1999) Vol 13:3 The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 193. 
19 Taxation Review Committee (KW Asprey (Chair)), Full Report, (Canberra, 1975). 
20 M Stewart, “Domesticating Tax Reform: The Family in Australian Tax and Transfer Law”, (1999) Vol 21 Sydney Law 
Review 453. 
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shared basis? In the Australian and New Zealand tax transfer systems, the sharing of parental care is 
acknowledged in the system design. 
4.2 Workforce Participation 
It is well established that women’s workforce participation rates are highly elastic, particularly during 
the period that mothers are juggling child-rearing duties with paid work.21 Decisions as to whether a 
mother will work, and the extent to which she will work, are affected not only by taxation 
considerations, but also by the need to purchase services to replace those she would normally provide – 
particularly childcare and other domestic services. In addition to the marginal rate of tax, other benefits, 
such as the Australian Family Tax Benefit and New Zealand Working for Families Tax Credit, may 
also be withdrawn as the spouse income, and correspondingly the family income increases – thus 
further increasing effective marginal rates of tax. 
Two recent studies have examined the impact of joint taxation systems on the workforce participation 
rate of married women. Dearing22 examined the workforce participation rates in Austria and Germany – 
two countries with similar economic systems. There are, however, two significant differences in 
relation to family support: parental leave is more generous in Austria than in Germany, and Austria 
adopts individual taxation, while Germany applies an income splitting joint taxation system. The study 
shows that Austrian mothers of infants are more likely to participate in the workforce than German 
mothers, although when hours of paid employment reaches about 30 the difference tends to disappear. 
This is attributed to the effect of the different maternity leave arrangements in the two countries. In 
relation to older children, where maternity leave is not a factor, Austrian women are more likely to 
undertake part-time or full-time employment than German women, although German women are more 
likely to work seven hours fewer than Austrian women. In all cases, there is a substantial drop in 
employment rates at about 20 hours, with fewer women working more than 20 hours each week. 
This employment pattern is attributed largely to the tax-transfer system. The study concluded that 
German women would be more likely to take on additional work if the Austrian conditions were 
available to them, while a small number of Austrian women would withdraw from the labour force if 
they were taxed under the German system, and parental leave was limited. Other factors, such as 
childcare availability in the two jurisdictions, are also relevant in making this decision. 
The second study23 examined the effect of the 1988 tax reforms in Canada, which altered the form of 
the concession available for married couples. Prior to 1988, the spousal concession was a deduction 
from taxable income of the taxpaying spouse. The deduction was a maximum of C$3,700, reducing 
dollar for dollar if the spouse earned income. This was replaced by a non-refundable tax credit of 
C$850, which reduced by 17 percent (the equivalent of the lowest tax rate) for each dollar that the 
spouse earned over C$500, to phase out at C$5,500. These reforms were similar to the tax reforms 
entered into in Australia in 1975. The effect of the change was that formerly the income of the spouse 
was taken into account at the marginal tax rate of the taxpayer, similar to a joint taxation system. 
Following the reforms, the tax credit reduced at the rate of the lowest marginal tax rate, as if the spouse 
were paying tax as an individual. 
                                                
21 P Apps, “Taxation and Labour Supply”, (2007) Vol 22:3 Australian Tax Forum 89. 
22 H Dearing, H Hofer, C Lietz, R Winter-Ebmer and K Wrohlich, “Why are Mothers Working Longer Hours in Austria than in 
Germany? A Comparative Microsimulation Analysis”, (2007) Vol 28:4 Fiscal Studies 463. 
23 TF Crossley and S-H Jeon, “Joint Taxation and the Labour Supply of Married Women: Evidence from the Canadian Tax 
Reform of 1988”, (2007) Vol 28:3 Fiscal Studies 343. 
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The study examined the employment patterns of women who were the secondary income-earners 
married to both high income and low income-earning husbands, and found an increase in employment 
among the women married to high income husbands in the order of nine to ten percent, primarily from 
part-time sources. The authors conclude that joint taxation systems discourage spouses from 
participating fully in the workforce, as the income earned by the spouse will be taxed at the marginal 
rates applicable to a higher income-earning spouse. The increased participation rate under an individual 
taxation system is largely from an increase in women undertaking part-time work. 
These case studies support the conclusions of a 1996 Australian study24 in which the authors 
modelled the effect of income splitting, and concluded that it would increase inefficiency without 
providing substantial equity gains. 
4.3 Effective Marginal Tax Rates 
A feature of dependant spouse deductions or credits is that they are generally withdrawn when the 
spouse is not regarded as being a dependant, which is usually based on independent earnings. This 
creates a problem similar to that encountered in the accumulation method of joint taxation, as any 
increases in income earned by the dependant spouse will result in a withdrawal of the credit or 
deduction. The effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) will incorporate the personal tax paid by the spouse 
on earnings; the withdrawal of the spouse credit or deduction and will also impact on other transfer 
payments that may be means tested on family income. 
Given that the labour participation rate for married women is very elastic, the effect of the EMTR 
assists in explaining why married women are more likely to undertake part-time work than full-time 
work. The effect of the Working for Families package on effective tax rates has been identified as a 
disincentive in New Zealand under the current system.25 
Taking the three effects into consideration, clearly the existence of marriage penalties impacts on a 
woman’s decisions: the timing of marriage; whether to participate in the workforce, and the extent of 
that participation. This reflects the elasticity of women’s participation rates in the workforce. Where a 
higher marginal tax rate is applied to the earnings of the secondary earner through a joint taxation 
system, that secondary earner is less likely to take on additional work, as identified in the Discussion 
Document Income Splitting for Families with Children. 
5.0 THE CURRENT NEW ZEALAND SYSTEM 
Governments may make provision for families through the taxation system, the transfer (welfare) 
system or a combination of the two. In New Zealand the Working for Families Tax Credit is provided 
as a transfer payment, whereas in Australia, although over 95 percent of recipients of the Family Tax 
Benefit take it as a transfer payment, they can choose to take the payment through the tax system. 
Family payments are the product of the interaction of a number of government policies. At the most 
basic level, governments want to prevent children from living in poverty, therefore the policy may be 
an income supplement to guarantee a base level of income to families. However, recent trends among 
                                                
24 G Jones and E Savage, “An Evaluation of Income Splitting with Variable Female Labour Supply”, (1996) Vol 72:218 
Economic Record 224. 
25 PricewaterhouseCoopers, Budget 2008 Tax Analysis (2008), available at <http://www.pwc.com/nz/eng/ins-sol/publ/tax/ 
Budget2008.pdf> (as at 4 July 2008); K Rankin, “Comment: An Income Tax Proposal for New Zealand”, (2007) Vol 13:1 
New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 10. 
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OECD countries have been to use such payments to encourage the parents to participate more fully in 
the workforce. Alternatively, children may be seen as a public benefit to which the community should 
contribute through the payment of a universal payment, or through financial support to parents who 
choose to stay at home rather than participating in the workforce. These factors make a rich cocktail of 
options that are available to policymakers in designing a family tax transfer system. 
Currently, the New Zealand Working for Families Tax Credit system incorporates the following 
policy elements: 
• Family Tax Credit is a means-tested benefit available to all parents based on the number and ages 
of children in the family. 
• In-Work Tax Credit is an additional amount available where parents work at least 30 hours during 
the week (or 20 hours for sole parents). 
• Minimum Family Tax Credit is available to very low income families with an income below 
$22,245 to ensure they have a weekly income of at least $355 after tax. 
• Parental Tax Credit or Paid Parental Leave is available to the parents of newborn infants. Mothers 
who have worked for at least 10 hours per week for 6 months prior to the expected birth date are 
eligible for Paid Parental Leave of up to 14 weeks. Parental Tax Credit is available for eight weeks 
after birth for parents who are not entitled to Paid Parental Leave. 
This combination of payments thus combines elements of community contribution to child welfare, 
work activation and safety net policies. However, the recognition of parents who choose to stay at 
home with children is limited to newborns or the period of parental leave available under an 
employee’s conditions of employment. 
6.0 THE INCOME SPLTTING DISCUSSION DOCUMENT26 
The Income Splitting Discussion Document makes it clear that income splitting is being considered 
only in the context of families with children. To this extent, the proposal is an implementation of 
family policy rather than tax policy. This then raises a number of issues that need to be considered. 
6.1 Threats to the Revenue through Income Splitting 
While Inland Revenue has identified threats to the revenue that arise from income splitting 
opportunities that currently exist,27 there is no reference to this threat to revenue in the Income Splitting 
Discussion Document. This also extends the inequity under which employees who do not have families 
and do not have the opportunity to restructure their income cannot access income splitting. It is likely 
to increase the number of employees terminating those arrangements in favour of alternative business 
structures under which income can be allocated to partners and other relatives who may not qualify as 
“family”. 
                                                
26 Inland Revenue, Income Splitting for Families with Children: A Government Tax Policy Discussion Document, (Wellington, 
April 2008). 
27 Inland Revenue, Briefing for the Incoming Minister of Revenue, (Wellington, November 2005). 
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6.2 Integration of Welfare and Taxation Systems 
There is an international trend towards the integration of tax and welfare systems. The New Zealand 
Tax Credit System is named as such, although it is actually paid as a transfer payment outside the tax 
system. If an income splitting policy were to be implemented, it raises significant administrative 
problems in relation to determining and implementing tax entitlements in a transfer payment 
environment.28 
As previously discussed, the current Working for Families Tax Credit system incorporates a number 
of policy design objectives, and the benefits paid for 2008 under the current system are estimated to be 
about $2.5 billion.29 The Income Splitting Discussion Document indicates that the fiscal cost of income 
splitting proposals is about $370 million, without identifying what concurrent changes would need to 
be made to Working for Families Tax Credits to offset the new scheme. It may be appropriate to 
redesign the In-Work Tax Credit component, as that is the group of taxpayers most likely to benefit 
from the proposal. However, it is much easier to appropriately target transfer payments though means 
testing than through the structure of the tax system. 
6.3 Inequities in Distribution of Benefit within Households 
A further problem with delivering family benefits through the taxation system is that the tax 
concession is distributed unevenly between the spouses, and is not directed to the primary carer. The 
modelling incorporated in the Income Splitting Discussion Document suggests that in most cases the 
primary income earner will benefit from the proposal while the secondary income earner will 
experience higher EMTRs. Transfer regimes are usually designed to ensure that payments are made to 
the person who will use the benefits most effectively – generally the primary carer for the family. If 
payments are made to the primary earner through the tax system, the allocation of the funds to the 
needs of the children becomes a matter for negotiation within the family. 
6.4 Disincentives to Participation Rates 
The Income Splitting Discussion Document30 acknowledges that the Government is committed to 
providing real choices to parents and carers in combining their work with their caring roles in 
accordance with the Choices for Living, Caring and Working action plan.31 This action plan 
acknowledges that some mothers would prefer to work fewer hours, or not at all, to help balance the 
demands of work and family. However, one of the specified goals of the action plan is to “provide 
financial support for families to ensure that all children have an adequate standard of living while at the 
same time optimising returns to work as much as possible”.32 The potential impact of this proposal on 
participation rates is acknowledged in the Income Splitting Discussion Document.33 It is likely to 
increase the hours of work of the primary earner (the father) while decreasing the hours of work of the 
secondary earner (the mother) as the EMTR on additional income earned by the primary earner will 
decrease, while the EMTR on income of the secondary earner will increase. This impact is the opposite 
of that proposed in the action plan, which is promoting initiatives to encourage mothers to return to 
                                                
28 H Hodgson and R Boden, “Not So Distant Cousins”, (2008) Vol 61:3 International Social Security Review 29. 
29 The Treasury, Budget Economic and Fiscal Update 2007, (Wellington, May 2007), Table 6.2, p 185. 
30 See n 26, p 2. 
31 New Zealand Government, Choices for Living, Caring and Working, (Wellington, August 2006). 
32 See n 31, p 12. 
33 See n 26. 
Hodgson 
NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL OF TAXATION LAW AND POLICY – Volume 14 408
work and to allow all parents to enjoy more flexible arrangements allowing them to better balance their 
work and family life. 
The action plan does acknowledge the special needs of families with a child under one year of age, 
and commits the Government to work towards appropriate parental leave arrangements. However, this 
is in the context that workers with appropriate leave arrangements are more likely to return to work, at 
least on a part-time basis, when the leave entitlement has been taken. 
6.5 Determining Qualifying Families 
The Income Splitting Discussion Document raises the problem of defining the family. As the policy 
is clearly intended to support children, the question becomes the age up to which children should be 
taken into account under this policy. If the Government is concerned about the potential impact of the 
shift in EMTRs on participation rates, it must be recognised in the design of the system. If the 
Government intends to encourage women to return to the workforce, the tax concession should only 
apply to families with young children. 
6.6 Joint Taxation Schedules as an Alternative 
The Income Splitting Discussion Document does discuss the option of adopting a US-style system of 
optional accumulation of family income, while applying a different tax scale to families that choose to 
file joint tax returns. As stated above, the rates currently applying in the US are set at levels that ensure 
that low and middle income earners access rates similar to an income splitting system, while high 
income earners pay slightly higher rates. This method does allow more effective targeting of tax 
benefits and allows for the fact that a family with a non-working spouse may be more able to pay tax as 
the spouse is able to take care of the children and undertake other home-based duties without needing 
to outsource these tasks. 
7.0 ALTERNATIVES TO JOINT TAXATION SYSTEMS 
Given that efficiency arguments show that the individual unit of taxation is more efficient than a pure 
joint taxation system, an alternative that has been adopted by many jurisdictions that adopt the 
individual as a tax base, including Australia, is to allow a tax credit or allowance to single income 
families. These allowances tend to be either a deduction against income, as in the US, or a reduction in 
the tax payable by way of a credit. The offset may be either refundable or non-refundable (wasteable). 
As noted earlier, the New Zealand Working for Families Tax Credit, although means-tested, does not 
depend to any extent on whether family income is earned by one or both parents. The In-Work Tax 
Credit requires the family to meet a work test under which the combined hours of work must be at least 
30 hours. It is reduced to 20 if the parent is a sole parent. 
Each of the deduction and the credit systems in fact has characteristics of one of the two forms of 
joint taxation. A deduction against the income of the earning spouse, even though it may equate to a 
second tax-free allowance in a particular jurisdiction, reduces the income of that spouse at the top 
marginal tax rate, which reflects an income-splitting approach. Such a deduction, as recognised by the 
Australian Asprey Committee in 1975,34 allows a greater tax concession for the spouse of a high 
income earner than for the spouse of a lower income earner, while the credit approach allows a similar 
amount to all eligible taxpayers. 
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The credit approach effectively increases the tax threshold for such families, but it has the same 
drawback as the “accumulation” method of joint taxation. Although it will allow single income families 
an amount that compensates for the additional tax-free allowance available to a two-income family, it 
does not adjust the income tax rates above the base rate. The credit is allowed at a fixed rate, usually 
equivalent to the tax rate applicable to incomes around or below the median level. Therefore, a family 
that pays a tax rate that is more than the rate of the credit allowed will still face a marginal tax payable 
on additional family earnings. This will have an even more dramatic impact if the credit is also 
withdrawn due to earnings of the spouse. 
If a credit has the effect of increasing the EMTR of single income families, relative to dual income 
families, then allowing a deduction could be considered more equitable as it reduces the income of the 
breadwinner, thus reducing the overall tax payable at the higher marginal rate – an effect that is closer 
to the “income splitting” model of joint taxation. This approach was adopted in Australia prior to the 
1975 tax reforms. One of the recommendations of the 1974 interim report of the Asprey Committee 
was that income tax support for families be changed from a system of deductions to a system of 
rebates.35 The Australian Commission of Enquiry into Poverty, chaired by Ronald F Henderson, 
enquiring into poverty concurrently, also recommended that the Child Endowment payment be 
increased and tax concessions be removed.36 By the time that the final report of the Asprey 
Committee37 was tabled in the following year, the Australian Government had announced that the 
system of concessional deductions would become a system of concessional rebates, with effect from 
the 1974-75 year of income. This was seen as a more equitable system of providing tax relief, as the 
amount made available to qualifying taxpayers was no longer affected by the marginal tax rate of the 
taxpayer:38 
“One view of the spouse deduction would be that at least a basic minimum which one spouse might 
be expected to spend on the other who is dependant on him should not be taxed. This points to a 
deduction approach to the concession. However, in lower income ranges, where the marginal rate of 
tax is less, the tax saving from a deduction is correspondingly smaller. It is questionable whether the 
effective assistance should be so unequally distributed, and should be least where it will be of most, 
if never great, real assistance. The Committee suggests that consideration be given to converting the 
present deduction to a tax rebate diminishing in relation to the income of the spouse.” 
While it is true to suggest that “a poor man’s wife should not be worth less than a rich man’s”,39 the 
two approaches again illustrate the different outcomes based on the “income splitting” approach and 
the “accumulation” approach. However, the major problem in implementing a system of tax credits is 
that they are applied against tax liabilities – leaving a problem in relation to access to the credits by 
taxpayers who do not have a tax liability sufficient to be absorbed by the credit. There are several 
approaches to this problem, including: 
• Transferable credits; 
• Refundable credits; 
                                                
35 Taxation Review Committee (KW Asprey (Chair)), Preliminary Report, (Canberra, 1974). 
36 RF Henderson, Commission of Inquiry into Poverty: Interim Report, (Canberra, 1974). 
37 See n 34. 
38 See n 36, para 12.4. 
39 See n 36, para 12.3. 
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• Transfer payments; and 
• Negative income tax. 
Transferable credits are credits that may be transferred between spouses. The principle is that where 
one spouse has a surplus credit that is not absorbed by their personal tax liability, then the surplus 
amount may be transferred to their spouse. It may require both spouses to be paying some tax, which 
may be the case where the lower earning spouse is in part-time work. In Australia, this approach can be 
seen in relation to the tax offsets available to seniors: each member of a married couple is available to a 
certain amount of credit. If one spouse does not lodge a tax return, or the tax liability is less than the 
available credit, the credit that has not been utilised may be transferred to their spouse who may 
effectively claim up to double the credit that would be available personally. This approach is used in 
Denmark in relation to the personal allowance, which is allowed in relation to each taxpayer, and can 
be transferred between spouses if not fully utilised. 
Credits may be refundable, or non-wasteable credits. Such credits are not limited to the tax liability 
of the claimant, and may result in a tax refund. A non-wasteable credit has a similar economic effect as 
a transfer payment, under which a payment is made directly to the claimant through the welfare system. 
While the tax and welfare systems are inevitably interlinked, and modern governments are moving to 
integrate the systems further, there are differences between the systems that may impact on the 
claimant, such as annual or periodic payment of entitlements; the requirement to lodge an income tax 
return; or the application of means tests.40 Where a claimant is clearly not taxable, and lodgement of 
income tax returns is not required, transfer payments are the preferred form of delivery. 
The New Zealand Working for Families Tax Credit is paid directly to recipients, either weekly, 
fortnightly or annually, and reconciled to annual family income at the end of the income year. By 
contrast, the Australian Family Tax Benefit, which provides a benefit for a low income spouse as well 
as in relation to children, is available either as a tax offset claimable with lodgement of an income tax 
return, or as a transfer payment payable fortnightly. Where the recipient is entitled to income support 
welfare payments, the payment must be claimed on a fortnightly basis and is paid with the income 
support entitlement. However, over 95 percent of all claimants prefer fortnightly transfer payments.41 
This then raises the question: why is the payment called a “Tax Benefit” when in the vast majority of 
cases it is delivered as a welfare payment? The answer seems to lie in the public statements of the 
Australian Treasurer at the time, when he announced that most families would pay no tax unless their 
income was more than A$40,000 to A$45,000.42 
A further option that has been canvassed periodically, but not adopted in a pure form, is the option of 
a negative income tax. Proposals for a negative income tax are based on the concept that transfer 
payments are a return of taxes that have been paid by the claimant, so the elimination of ‘churn’43 will 
                                                
40 H Hodgson and R Boden, “Not So Distant Cousins”, (2008) Vol 61:3 International Social Security Review 29. 
41 H Hodgson, “More than Just DNA: Tax, Welfare and the Family”, (Paper presented at the 19th Annual Australasian Tax 
Teachers Association Conference, Brisbane, Australia, 23 January 2007). 
42 P Costello, Meet the Press 30/04/2006, (Canberra, 2006), available at <http://legacy.ten.com.au/promo.aspx?currentpage= 
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result in a more efficient system overall.44 While governments have moved to substantial integration of 
the welfare and taxation systems, to date the practical issues surrounding full integration have not been 
overcome.45 
While not a tax credit or deduction, another alternative that may be considered is the splitting of 
property income. Currently, certain types of income may be taxed as being received jointly if 
investments are held in joint names or it may be alienated to a spouse if there is a formal and valid 
assignment of the income. These principles could be broadened to permit splitting of all property 
income between spouses. This would acknowledge that income from personal services is appropriately 
taxed to a particular person who has earned that income, but that income from property relates to assets 
that are acquired from an accumulation of household wealth. However, such a proposal would clearly 
only benefit those who had accumulated assets, generally those who are more wealthy. It would also 
encourage those who had the capacity to establish entities to undertake their business activities. Such a 
proposal would only be viable if: 
• It were hedged with anti-avoidance provisions to ensure that personal services income was not 
converted to investment income through an interposed entity; or 
• A schedular system of taxation was introduced under which appropriate tax rates were applied to 
acknowledge the inherent differences between income from personal services and income derived 
from capital sources. 
It could also be argued that where the advantage in an income splitting system comes from access to 
a second tax-free threshold (where the tax system provides a tax free threshold), a restructuring of the 
tax rates applicable could address the lack of neutrality. If there was no tax-free threshold, and the 
lower tax brackets were sufficiently broad, there would be no advantage gained by entering into 
structures that allow some families to access income splitting. However, this could only be achieved 
through a full review of income tax scales. 
8.0 CONCLUSION 
While intuitively a joint, income splitting, taxation system may seem to be more equitable to 
families, the evidence consistently shows that individual taxation systems are more efficient, both in 
relation to the impact on the labour market and in minimising horizontal distortions between single and 
married taxpayers. However, the goal of equity does encourage alternative methods of providing 
concessions to families, to reflect the different vertical equity position of the family unit. 
While these concessions do achieve some measure of redistribution, the conundrum that results is 
that such concessions effectively shift an individual taxation system closer to a joint taxation system, 
through: 
• Means-testing of concessions based on family income; 
• EMTRs that impact middle income families more severely; 
• Tax credits that mimic an accumulation joint tax system; and/or 
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• Tax deductions that mimic an income splitting joint tax system. 
The New Zealand Income Splitting Discussion Document proposes a course of action that is contrary 
to the OECD trends of the last 30 years. It has been shown that the efficiency costs of joint taxation 
systems outweigh the benefits that may arise. While the proposal is made on the basis of facilitating 
choice, an efficient economy requires participation rates to remain adequate to drive the economy and 
married women are the most mobile sector of the labour force. Accordingly, the current policy trends 
are to remove disincentives to return to the workforce. 
Unlike the Australian Family Tax Credit system, the Working for Families Tax Credit system 
currently in place in New Zealand does not have an element that relates to whether a family is a single 
or dual income family. There are problems inherent in such systems, as the necessary means testing on 
the secondary earner can aggravate the problem of EMTRs increasing as income increases, as both 
family and spousal entitlements are separately affected by taper rates. However, it would seem that a 
more viable alternative to a joint taxation system would be to incorporate an additional benefit related 
to the status of the spouse. 
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